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INTRODUCTION
For most of the twentieth century, Americans left urban centers for
suburban landscapes.1
[O]ver the last one hundred years, American land use policy [was] designed
to segregate uses of land, reduce population density, and facilitate the use of
automobiles . . . . [S]uburban sprawl has come to represent the American
dream, where citizens can own a home, two-car garage, both back and front
yards, and if you are truly lucky, a pool.2

Indeed, an antiurban attitude is ingrained in the American psyche.3
Americans’ deeply rooted desire for independence coupled with an abundant
supply of low-priced land created a low-density land use pattern.4 The growth
of affordable automobiles in the twentieth century allowed for satisfaction of
the deeply ingrained American desire to spread out.5 Consequently,
Americans fled urban areas for the suburbs.6 The proliferation of low-density

1 See MARK MATHER, KELVIN POLLARD & LINDA A. JACOBSEN, POPULATION REFERENCE
BUREAU: FIRST RESULTS FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 15 fig.6 (2011), http://
www.prb.org/pdf11/reports-on-america-2010-census.pdf [http://perma.cc/FN89-UCA2] (showing
that 7% of America’s population lived in suburbs in 1910, compared with 51% in 2010). But see John
McIlwain, Suburbs 2.0: The Evolving American Suburb, URBAN LAND (June 1, 2011),
http://urbanland.uli.org/economy-markets-trends/suburbs-2-0-the-evolving-american-suburbs/
[http://perma.cc/UFH7-BC63] (“The rapid growth on the furthest edges of metropolitan regions is
a continuation of a pattern six decades old; what is new is the resurgence of the innermost ring of
suburbs in the last decade. This new pattern of suburban growth, where both the innermost and
outermost parts of the region are growing rapidly, has provided evidence to both those who believe
that the suburbs will continue to grow forever outward in the years ahead, and to those who believe
that the suburbs have reached an inflection point where most growth will shift to the closer-in parts
of metropolitan regions.”).
2 Timothy Polmateer, Note, How Localism’s Rationales Limit New Urbanism’s Success and What
New Regionalism Can Do About It, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1085, 1087 (2014). See generally KENNETH
T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985)
(describing the history of suburban sprawl in the United States and outlining how attaining a
suburban lifestyle has come to define success in American culture).
3 See Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1086 (“[Thomas] Jefferson believed urban living was
detrimental to the health of society and preferred other forms of settlement.”).
4 See James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism, and Diversity: Progressive Planning
Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 45, 46 (2002) (“American growth patterns have been driven by natural and unnatural
forces. Vast amounts of land tended to foster individualism, privacy, and noncontiguous, noncompact land use patterns.”).
5 See JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF AMERICA’S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 85-112 (1993) (explaining that Americans are
“Car Crazy”).
6 Id.
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development typified by post–World War II suburbs is called sprawl.7
Unfortunately, this low-density development is inefficient and causes a host
of social and environmental problems.8
City planners, environmentalists, and academics alike widely criticize the
proliferation of suburban sprawl. These critics argue that sprawl is
fundamentally problematic because it is unsustainable and destroys vibrant
neighborhoods and communities.9 “Evidence of sprawl surrounds us . . . .
[S]prawl consume[d] nearly six million acres of farmland annually [from 1954
to 1974] . . . .”10 Sprawl makes us overly dependent on automobiles, “which
imposes enormous costs and degrades our quality of life . . . [by] impos[ing]
burdensome infrastructure costs”11 and creating a society stratified by
“income, education, race, and ethnicity.”12
This Comment assumes suburban sprawl is inimical to the common good
and ought to be slowed and, if possible, reversed. My purpose is not to prove
that there is a problem, but to explore a potential solution: Land Value
Taxation (LVT). Finding a solution, however, begins with identifying the
causes of the problem. Accordingly, Part I briefly examines single-use
zoning’s contribution to the problem of sprawl, and concludes that New
Urbanists are making tremendous progress toward reforming single-use
zoning. I suggest that our current property tax system is another cause of
sprawl and, given the success of zoning reform, ought to be the target of New
Urbanist policy advocacy. Part II posits LVT as an alternative to our current
single-rate tax system and explores LVT’s dual ability to incentivize denser
development and disincentive land speculation at the suburban fringe. Part
III concludes that LVT can be most effectively implemented at the regional
level.
I. SUBURBAN SPRAWL AND THE NEW URBANIST RESPONSE
While a prolific social phenomenon like suburban sprawl is no doubt caused
by a number of complex and overlapping factors, the greatest contributor to
7
8

Id.
See id. at 113-24 (detailing the environmental, social and economic cost of the exponential
increase in the use of automobiles); Jeremy R. Meredith, Note, Sprawl and the New Urbanist Solution,
89 VA. L. REV. 447, 452-66 (2003) (detailing the same costs for sprawl).
9 See Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth Amendment,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 873 (2000) (arguing that the debate over whether or not sprawl is harmful is over,
and suggesting that the time has come to argue about its cures, not its effects).
10 Id. at 875; see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 597 (95th ed. 1974) (showing that the number of acres of farmland in the United
States decreased by 119 million from 1954 to 1974).
11 Dowling, supra note 9, at 875-76.
12 Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Mills, The Causes of Metropolitan Suburbanization, J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 1993, at 135, 137.
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sprawl is single-use zoning. Local governments use zoning as the primary means
to control land use.13 American zoning policy in the twentieth century created
sprawl by using single-use zoning almost exclusively. Single-use zoning regulates
the development of land based on the intended end use.14 It allows only one kind
of use in a specified zone.15 Residential development is separated from
commercial development, which is separated from industrial development.
Mixed uses within a zone are prohibited; commercial activity is not permitted in
residential zones and vice versa.
The result of single-use zoning is that “residential zones cover large
amounts of thinly populated land, [and] few people can live within walking
distance of commercial zones.”16 Single-use zoning’s first article of faith is
that the best and highest use of land is the single-family detached home, and
that all other uses are inferior and thus must be kept separate.17 The Supreme
Court upheld the practice of single-use zoning in its now iconic decision
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.18
The spread of single-use zoning was aided not only by local zoning
ordinances, but also by state and federal policy. For example:
[T]he federal government created the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA)—an agency that subsidized home ownership by insuring private
sector loans—but only for homes that met FHA standards. These standards
prohibited gridded streets in residential neighborhoods, instead describing
cul-de-sacs as “the most attractive form for family dwellings.” The FHA also
recommended residential streets that were twenty-four to twenty-six feet
wide—about 50% larger than some older streets. FHA standards also required
long blocks and low densities. Because the majority of American mortgages
were FHA-insured, the FHA minimum standards governed most new
development. And local governments generally adopted rules based on FHA

13 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 57 (4th
ed. 2013) (“The single most important mechanism by which local governments control land use is
the zoning ordinance.”).
14 Michael Lewyn, New Urbanist Zoning for Dummies, 58 ALA. L. REV. 257, 263 (2006)
(“[S]ingle-use zoning (also known as ‘Euclidean zoning’ after the [1926] case which upheld that
technique) became virtually universal.” (citations omitted)).
15 Id. at 258.
16 Id.
17 ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 63. The notion that residential uses must be kept separate
from nonresidential uses emerged from a group of landscape architects operating on the European
Continent in the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries—chief among them Le Corbusier. See
KUNSTLER, supra note 5, at 71-73, 78; ROY LUBOVE, THE URBAN COMMUNITY: HOUSING AND
PLANNING IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1-22 (1967) (discussing the roots of urban planning).
18 272 See U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a local zoning ordinance that created six zones and
allowed only a single use within each zone as a valid exercise of the enacting municipality’s police
power).
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standards, which meant that even homes not insured by the FHA were
governed by FHA rules.19

So, for much of the twentieth century, American land use policy at the
local, state, and federal levels encouraged sprawl, accelerating the decline of
walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods and leading to an increasingly stratified
and automobile-dependent society.
New Urbanism20 emerged as an anti-sprawl movement.21 Jane Jacobs, one
of the earliest and harshest critics of single-use zoning, is in many ways the
mother of New Urbanism.22 Jacobs argued single-use zoning destroys vibrant
cities by “stifling the cross-fertilization of ideas and experiences that is so
important to a city’s economic and social health”23 and that arises naturally in
a dense and diverse city. Today, New Urbanists strongly criticize single-use
zoning and urge a switch to mixed-use zoning, which “allows people to work
and shop within walking distance of their homes . . . .”24 New Urbanists’
proposed pattern of development promotes a sense of community and reduces
dependence on automobiles.25 New Urbanism seeks to create human-scaled,

19 Lewyn, supra note 14, at 264-65 (footnotes omitted) (citing Michael Southworth & Eran
Ben-Joseph, Regulated Streets: The Evolution of Standards for Suburban Residential Streets (Inst. of
Urban and Reg’l Dev., Working Paper No. 593, 1993)).
20 I use the term New Urbanism broadly to refer to the range of responses to single-use zoning
and the resultant sprawl. See Joseph E. Gyourko & Witold Rybczynski, Financing New Urbanism
Projects: Obstacles and Solutions, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 733, 733 (2000) (explaining that New
Urbanism is also referred to as “traditional neighborhood development, neotraditional development,
and smart growth”). While each of these movements varies from the others in subtle ways, for the
purposes of this Comment, their overall goals are sufficiently similar to warrant being lumped
together.
21 See Meredith, supra note 8, at 451 (explaining that New Urbanism “focuses primarily on
spatial solutions to urban sprawl at the regional, neighborhood, and block level”); Polmateer, supra
note 2, at 1095 (“New Urbanism attempts to manage development problems like sprawl . . . .”).
22 See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961); see also
SULEIMAN OSMAN, THE INVENTION OF BROWNSTONE BROOKLYN: GENTRIFICATION AND
THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTICITY IN POSTWAR NEW YORK 173 (2011) (“If Le Corbusier was a
guru for modernist urban planning students of the 1950s, Jane Jacobs was the founding mother of
the New Urbanism . . . .”).
23 Jay Wickersham, Jane Jacob’s Critique of Zoning: From Euclid to Portland and Beyond, 28 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 550-51 (2001) (citing JACOBS, supra note 22, at 165-74).
24 ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 13 at 63; see also ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN
NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 25 (2000) (“[In
a traditional, mixed-use neighborhood, citizens] can live above the store, next to the store, five
minutes from the store, or nowhere near the store, and it is easy to imagine the different age groups
and personalities that would prefer each alternative. In this way and others, the traditional
neighborhood provides for an array of lifestyles. In [single-use] suburbia, there is only one available
lifestyle: to own a car and to need it for everything.”).
25 Lewyn, supra note 14, at 258-59.
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walkable, mixed-use development in which spontaneous human interaction is
possible.26
Not surprisingly, New Urbanists fought sprawl by attacking its wellspring:
single-use zoning.27 New Urbanism categorically rejected the foundational
value judgment of single-use zoning, namely, “that the appropriate way to
order different land uses is to separate them from one another into single-use
zones.”28 Instead, New Urbanists sought to regulate density rather than use
by creating the “SmartCode”:29
While ordinary zoning codes regulate a building’s character (e.g., its height,
building and lot size, and parking facilities) by its use, the SmartCode
regulates a building’s character by the urban intensity of its zone—it sets up
one set of rules for buildings in each zone, regardless of whether the buildings
are being used for residential or commercial purposes.30

Surprisingly, New Urbanists have been successful in fighting single-use
zoning and implementing the SmartCode.31 Indeed, “[d]uring the past forty
years, the lessons taught by Jane Jacobs about urban form have largely been
incorporated into land-use regulation.”32 The role of zoning is transforming.
Rather than separating uses, zoning is now most often used “in the service of
promoting walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods connected by transit.”33 Cities
26 See id. (laying out the principles of New Urbanism); see also CONG. FOR THE NEW
URBANISM, CHARTER OF THE NEW URBANISM (2001), http://www.cnu.org/sites/default/
files/charter_english.pdf [http://perma.cc/44 ZV-V4ZV] (same).
27 See J. Peter Byrne, The Rebirth of the Neighborhood, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1595, 1597 (2013)
(listing zoning reform as one of the three chief tools of New Urbanists).
28 Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).
29 The SmartCode is one example of the more generic form-based codes used by New
Urbanists, but since both regulate density rather than use, I use the terms interchangeably. See
ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 63 (“The movement in favor of form-based zoning likewise
deemphasizes segregation of uses in favor of specifying urban forms or physical layouts that might
encompass mixed-uses like retailers in close proximity to residences.”). Notably, form-based codes
do still regulate some non-compatible uses like heavy industry and residential housing. See generally
DANIEL G. PAROLEK ET AL., FORM BASED CODES: A GUIDE FOR PLANNERS, URBAN
DESIGNERS, MUNICIPALITIES, AND DEVELOPERS 12 (2008) (“[W]hile FBCs [form-based codes]
differ radically from conventional zoning in many ways, they are similar in a few ways. FBCs also
isolate noxious uses, such as heavy manufacturing and airports, and they generally only regulate
private buildings as they affect the public good, leaving plentry of room for individual tastes and
styles. As necessary, they may also contain provisions similar to conventional zoning for such issues
as non-conforming uses and affordable housing.”).
30 Lewyn, supra note 14, at 269.
31 See Tony Perez, Top 10 Misconceptions About Form-Based Codes, BETTER CITIES AND
TOWNS, Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 1, 1 (“Since 1981, approximately 400 form-based codes (FBCs) have
been prepared for communities across the [United States], and as of 2012, 252 of them have been
adopted. Eighty-two percent of the adoptions have taken place in the past 10 years.”).
32 Byrne, supra note 27, at 1598.
33 Id.

2016]

What To Do When Main Street Is Legal Again

761

are now “permitting greater mixing of uses on a single site . . . . This trend
now culminates in form-based coding . . . .”34
That zoning is decreasingly an impediment to New Urbanism is
astounding given that less than twenty years ago, “virtually everything [New
Urbanists] want[ed] to do [was] . . . . illegal.”35 Indeed, in 2006, Chad
Emerson wrote his now seminal article Making Main Street Legal Again: The
SmartCode Solution to Sprawl.36 In his opening line, Emerson boldly claimed:
Under zoning codes in much of the United States today, building a project
similar to classic American communities such as Charleston, Savannah, Key
West, or Alexandria, would be illegal. Many zoning codes also prohibit the
creation of a neighborhood with a traditional corner store or a classic
American main street where the shopkeeper lived above her shop.37

It is therefore truly amazing that less than a decade later, the SmartCode
has made so much progress in American land use planning.
Zoning reform, however, is a necessary but not sufficient element in
achieving the New Urbanist agenda.38 In fact, it is only the frontier. As
municipalities and communities across America continue to adopt formbased codes, the New Urbanist movement should look to new policy
initiatives that can create a better built environment. Now is the time to start
planning for a future in which zoning codes are not an impediment to New
Urbanism. Accordingly, this Comment proposes the Land Value Tax (LVT)
as the next major initiative New Urbanists should pursue. The Land Value
Tax is not a new concept; it is not even a new concept for New Urbanists.39
This Comment, however, makes the additional argument that LVT is most
effectively implemented at the regional or metropolitan level. Given the
success of New Urbanist zoning reforms, the time is ripe to plan the future of
the movement, and a Land Value Tax is a key component in a comprehensive
New Urbanist legal regime. Land Value Taxation must become a club in the bag
of New Urbanist policy.

34 Id. at 1599.
35 Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1093 (1996).
36 Chad D. Emerson, Making Main Street Legal Again: The SmartCode Solution to Sprawl, 71 MO.
L. REV. 637 (2006).
37 Id. at 637.
38 See Thomas A. Gihring, Incentive Property Taxation: A Potential Tool for Urban Growth
Management, 65 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 62, 62 (1999) (noting that “[r]arely have [New Urbanists]

looked beyond regulations [like zoning] for solutions to the twin problems of urban sprawl and
central city stagnation” and proposing a focus on a revised property tax as an additional tool).
39 See id. (providing an example of a New Urbanist suggesting LVT as a means of achieving
New Urbanist goals).

762

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 755

II. LAND VALUE TAX40
A. The History and Theory
Nearly every jurisdiction in the United States employs a single-rate property
tax system—that is, they tax land and improvements to land (i.e. buildings) at
the same rate.41 Thus, “property tax is actually two types of taxes—one on
building values, and the other on land values.”42 Henry George, a nineteenth
century politician, criticized this two-rate approach as inefficient and unjust.43 As
a superior alternative, George proposed eliminating the tax on building values in
favor of a single tax on land values.44 For a little over a century now, George and
his followers have been advocating LVT as an equitable and efficient alternative
to the current single-rate property tax system.45
Proponents of LVT criticize the manner in which the single-rate system
combines two taxes into a unitary property tax because “the property tax is,
economically speaking, a combination of one of the worst taxes—the part that
is assessed on real estate improvements . . . and one of the best taxes—the tax

40 A threshold question not addressed in this Comment is whether LVT’s different treatment
of land and buildings violates a state constitution’s uniformity clause. See J. Anthony Coughlan, Land
Value Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 261, 262 (1999) (describing a
state constitution’s uniformity clause as a “constitutional requirement that taxes upon the same
classes of subjects be uniform,” which “may forbid the subclassification of real property into land
and improvements”). Indeed, in Pennsylvania, the only state to experiment broadly with LVT, the
issue has not come up despite Pennsylvania’s use of LVT for over a century. See id. (“[T]here are no
reported rulings directly regarding the constitutionality of a two-tiered real property tax.”). To the
best of my knowledge, this remains the case today. Nevertheless, after surveying the relevant
Pennsylvania case law, Coughlan concludes LVT does not violate Pennsylvania’s uniformity clause.
Id. at 269; see also PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of
subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected
under general laws.”). Coughlan does speculate, however, that fifteen other states’ uniformity
clauses, read literally, are unlikely to allow LVT. See Coughlan, supra, at 291. Obviously, if LVT is
unconstitutional in certain states, switching to it becomes politically and practically difficult.
41 See Jeffrey P. Cohen & Cletus C. Coughlin, An Introduction to Two-Rate Taxation of Land and
Buildings, 87 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 359, 359, 366 (2005).
42 Alana Hartzok, Pennsylvania Farmers and the Split-Rate Tax, in LAND-VALUE TAXATION:
THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC FINANCE 239, 239 (Kenneth C. Wenzer
ed., 1999).
43 See generally HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE
OF INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSION AND OF THE INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF WEALTH;
THE REMEDY 403-29 (Robert Schalkenbach Found. 1935) (1879). “[R]ent should, both on grounds
of expediency and justice, be the peculiar subject of taxation …. [A]ll taxation should be abolished
save a tax upon the value of land.” Id. at 423-24.
44 See id. at 431-73 (justifying a single tax on land with reference to the tax’s effect on the
production and distribution of wealth, on individuals and classes, and on social organization and
social life).
45 See LAND VALUE TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC
FINANCE (Kenneth C. Wenzer ed., 1999) (collecting essays advocating for a switch to LVT).
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on land or site value . . . .”46 These critics complain that the single-rate system
“punishes anyone who puts up a decent building made of durable materials”
by encouraging land speculation, shoddy construction, and underutilization.47
The tax on buildings is problematic because it is a tax on production.
Buildings exist to help people accomplish tasks. When a company constructs
a building, it does so because it thinks the building will help it be more
profitable. The building is part of the company’s production costs just like
labor or equipment. When a building is taxed at the same rate as the land on
which it sits, there is a strong disincentive for the company to expend capital
to improve the land unless the improvement’s value is greater than the
increase in the tax burden on the land.48 Thus, taxing buildings, even though
they are a cost of production, raises the costs of goods and therefore reduces
the supply. Thus, taxes on buildings are inefficient because they increase the
cost of production, thereby driving down demand for that item. Put simply:
the higher the tax rate on buildings, the fewer buildings there will be.49
Conversely, a tax on the value of land is efficient because, unlike the quantity
of buildings, the quantity of land is fixed; therefore, an increase in the tax rate on
land cannot result in a decrease in its supply.50 The only way to offset an increase
in the tax rate of land is to increase the production of the land.51
As the tax rate on land increases, landowners have a strong incentive to
make capital improvements to land that will produce enough revenue to offset
the higher taxes.52 “[B]y penalizing non-production, [taxing land] encourages
46 William Vickrey, Simplification, Progression, and a Level Playing Field, in LAND VALUE
TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 45, at 17,
17; see also RICHARD F. DYE & RICHARD W. ENGLAND, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y,
ASSESSING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LAND VALUE TAXATION 4 (2010), https://www.
lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1760_983_Assessing%20the%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20of%20Land
%20Value%20Taxation.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFL4-GKHS] [hereinafter ASSESSING THE
THEORY] (“The traditional property tax is controversial because it is widely perceived to be unfair
and regressive.”).
47 JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE: REMAKING OUR EVERYDAY
WORLD FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 197 (1996).
48 Hartzok, supra note 42, at 239.
49 See id. (arguing that a tax on buildings results in “lower production, higher prices, or both”
(emphasis added)).
50 See id. (“A tax on land cannot be avoided by producing less land, or by moving land from
one jurisdiction to another.”).
51 See id. at 239-40 (“Land is most certainly not a product of human labor but a gift of
nature . . . . Unlike a levy on capital items, a tax on land is not a cost of production in itself but
functions as a type of user fee which has the added advantage of encouraging efficient land use while
curbing land speculation.”).
52 See Mark Speirs, Land Value Taxation: An Underutilized Complement to Smart Growth
Policies 38 (Dec. 13, 2010) (unpublished B.S. thesis, University of Pennsylvania) http://www.
[http://perma.cc/HQ37-M5GL]
urbantoolsconsult.org/upload/markspeirsfinalpaper12-20.pdf
(stating that a tax on land does not affect the amount of the commodity that a firm produces and
therefore is more efficient).
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landowners to develop their land, thereby creating jobs and other benefits. It
also reduces speculation, bringing land prices more into line to [sic] true
market rates.”53 Accordingly, LVT proponents argue that land should be taxed
at a much higher rate than improvements to land because such a tax will
incentivize more efficient land usage.54 In sum, LVT provides landowners
both a carrot and a stick. LVT’s carrot comes in the form of the benefit the
tax system provides: if landowners put bigger buildings on their land, the
value of those buildings will be taxed at a much lower rate than the land.
LVT’s stick is that if a landowner holds land in an unproductive fashion and
fails to make improvements, it will cost much more than under a single-rate
system.
LVT’s greatest virtue, however, is that it is a value capture tax. By taxing
the value of land at a high rate, the public recaptures part of the value added
to land through the expenditure of public funds for improvements like sewers
and roads.55 By capturing the value of public expenditures, LVT eliminates a
free rider problem caused by developers making money off tax expenditures
meant to benefit the whole community.56 The value capture feature of LVT
creates a more equitable distribution of tax burdens: “[O]wners of valuable
land benefit from socially created value based on the location of their land, so
under a system of [land-]value taxation the relation between tax paid and
benefits received would be clear and proportional.”57 Under our current
system of single-rate taxation “taxes may be (and often are) out of proportion
with benefits received, which a normal person would rightfully construe as
unfair.”58 Kunstler illustrates the intuitive fairness of LVT: “For instance, a
homeowner whose [property tax] is increased because he decides to fix up his
old house derives no increased benefit in municipal services. Why should he
be penalized for taking care of his building?”59 In sum, LVT’s value capturing
ability creates a more equitable and efficient property tax system.

53
54
55

Id. at 15.
See, e.g., KUNSTLER supra note 47, at 198-207.
See Coughlan, supra note 40, at 266-67 (stating that LVT can be used to capture some or all
of the value added to real property by government expenditures).
56 See, e.g., Walter Rybeck, Transit-induced Land Values, 5 ECON. DEV. COMMENT. 23 (1981)
(showing that the completion of Washington’s Metrorail system created windfalls for nearby
developers, who could now charge rental premiums thanks to their newfound proximity to mass
transit). For a hypothetical illustration of the free rider problem, see infra notes 69–70 (citing Speirs,
supra note 52, at 20-25).
57 KUNSTLER, supra note 47, at 202.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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B. Why Land Value Taxation Accomplishes New Urbanist Goals
1. Infill Development
Because Land Value Taxation incentivizes more intensive use of land,
switching to it would create the more dense walkable neighborhoods sought by
New Urbanists.60 “A major objective of [New Urbanism] is to alter the spatial
distribution of population and employment, principally by increasing the density
and intensity of development . . . .”61 LVT accomplishes this objective by creating
a strong incentive for infill development. Infill development is the process of
“developing vacant or under-used parcels within existing urban [and suburban]
areas that are already largely developed.”62
LVT’s high tax rate on land rather than on buildings and improvements
to land creates an incentive to build more improvements. It also creates
disincentives to build structures that generate little revenue such as surface
parking lots or large yards. In urban areas, where tax rates would increase the
most under LVT given the high site-value of land, developers would be
incentivized to make substantial improvements to their land in order to take
advantage of the tax-favored status of improvements.63 Further, “vacant and
underutilized sites would have heavy tax increases, thus providing financial
incentives to bring about infill development and general upgrading.”64
Indeed, the data from Pittsburgh—the only major city in the United States

60 See Speirs, supra note 52, at 18 (stating that taxing land more heavily than building values
promotes urban revitalization).
61 GREGORY K. INGRAM ET AL., LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, SMART GROWTH
POLICIES: AN EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS AND OUTCOMES 135 (2009).
62 Infill Development: Completing the Community Fabric, MUN. RES. SERV. CTR.,
http://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-Topics/Planning/Development-Types-and-Land-Uses/Infill-Devel
opment-Completing-the-Community-Fabric.aspx [http://perma.cc/C8UD-M5PB] (last modified
May 18, 2015) [hereinafter Infill Development]. Most municipalities and towns have many parcels of
land that are either undeveloped or underdeveloped. Infill development seeks to utilize these
parcels, creating a greater overall density, rather than simply “sprawling” to yet another undeveloped
farm or plot of vacant land. Infill development aims to achieve more than scatter-shot development:
by creating more dense land use, infill development creates more coherent neighborhoods. See id.
(“Successful infill development is characterized by overall residential densities high enough to support
improved transportation choices as well as a wider variety of convenience services and amenities. It can
return cultural, social, recreational and entertainment opportunities, gathering places, and vitality to older
centers and neighborhoods.”). But see J. Terrence Farris, The Barriers to Using Urban Infill Development to
Achieve Smart Growth, 12 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 1, 8 (2001) (providing an overview of the disincentives
for infill development).
63 See Gihring, supra note 38, at 75 (“[C]apital investment in building improvements is
rewarded through the incentive of lower taxes.”).
64 Id. at 73.
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to implement LVT—supports the conclusion that “the real power of [LVT]
is to stimulate central city revitalization.”65
LVT’s ability to incentivize infill development will also decrease urban
blight by increasing the costs of leaving a building vacant. Vacant buildings
and lots are a primary cause of urban blight, and “[a] significant portion of
vacant buildings are owned by speculators who buy inner-city property
cheaply in the hope that future development, whether spurred by the
government or by private developers, will allow them to sell their land for a
substantial profit.”66 Not surprisingly, these urban speculators hold land
unproductively (by not building on it) because “most cities’ property taxes
impose relatively low burdens on land holding, but heavy burdens on land
using. By keeping buildings vacant, speculators pay less in taxes while
avoiding the problems of dealing with tenants.”67 What’s more, even when
these vacant properties do have improvements, “[m]aintenance is typically
ignored ‘because it does not affect actual property prices in a way that makes
speculation more profitable.’”68 Under an LVT regime, however, the holding
costs of vacant land will increase, and speculators will be forced to at least use
the property for a purpose that generates enough revenue to pay the taxes on
the property.
An example helps illustrate how LVT encourages infill development,
especially in urban areas.69 Imagine an empty lot located in a city; the assessed
value of the lot is $8360. A typical tax rate for this lot is 1.7%, or $142 annually.
Thus, for roughly $12 a month, the owner of this lot can leave it vacant and
hope its value increases. There is almost no incentive for the landowner to
make any capital improvements to the land. Instead, the owner takes a waitand-see approach, hoping a major public works project or private
development such as a hospital will drive up the value of the land (effectively
free riding on such public or private investment). If that happens, the owner
can sell the land for five or ten times its current value.70 Even taking a
conservative estimate, the owner could sell the land for $40,000. With a tax
burden of only $142 annually, the owner can afford to hold the property for
fifteen or more years waiting for its value to increase and still make a
handsome profit even discounted to present value.
65 Id. (citing Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Impact of Urban Land Taxation: The
Pittsburgh Experience 22-25 (Ctr. for Inst. Reform and the Informed Sector, Working Paper No. 47,
1992), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABP359.pdf [http://perma.cc/3SRH-V8EL]).
66 David T. Kraut, Note, Hanging Out the No Vacancy Sign: Eliminating the Blight of Vacant
Buildings from Urban Areas, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1152 (1999).
67 Id. at 1152-53.
68 Id. (quoting Hans Skifter Anderson, Motives for Investments in Housing Rehabilitation Among
Private Landlords Under Rent Control, 13 HOUSING STUD. 177, 197 (1998)).
69 This example is taken from Speirs, supra note 52, at 20-25.
70 Id. at 20-21.
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On the other hand, if, that same lot were located in a jurisdiction employing
a pure LVT (no tax on improvements), and was taxed at a normal LVT rate of
8.5%, the speculator’s holding costs increase to $710 a year—five times the
holding cost under a single-rate system. The developer is now more likely to
develop the property, at least to a level where it generates enough revenue to
offset the increase in tax rate (from 1.7% to 8.5%). Thus, under an LVT regime,
our hypothetical lot is more likely to be improved than under a two-rate system.
This (overly simplified) example illustrates the ability of LVT to encourage
infill development and reduce blight.
In sum, LVT encourages infill development by reducing the tax on
buildings, which facilitates new construction and replacement of obsolete
buildings in urban areas. “Property owners, responding to the financial
inducement to reduce the land-to-building value ratio, would build more
intensively on vacant and underutilized sites.”71 The total effect over time in
urban areas “would be to increase property values, and thus the tax base,
where that is most needed.”72
LVT’s infill-producing effect also ameliorates a challenge to early New
Urbanist developments. Critics allege that New Urbanist developments are
really just suburbs for yuppies who have traveled to Europe and are nostalgic
for the streets of Paris or Berlin.73 Indeed, in their earliest iterations, New
Urbanist communities had to be built at the outer limits of metropolitan areas
because that was the only place where enough land could be assembled to recreate the sufficiently densely built walkable mixed-use neighborhoods so
favored by New Urbanists.74 Consequently, “[m]ost first generation New
Urbanist developments appear to be suburban rather than urban; their only
impact is to drain more wealth and tax base from the city.”75
To reverse this trend, New Urbanists should focus on creating infill
development.76 Indeed, “[t]he only strategy for generating a more affordable
expanding housing supply is to establish a program of higher density
development, predominantly targeted at urban infill development and around
transit corridors throughout the region.”77 LVT incentivizes exactly this kind
of development by raising the cost of surface parking and oversized lots for

71
72
73

Gihring, supra note 38, at 63.
Id. at 73-74.
See Kushner, supra note 4, at 61 & n.71 (describing the locations after which New Urbanist
developments are modeled).
74 See Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1120 (“Critics suggest that most new urbanism development
has occurred on the outskirts of metropolitan areas. As a result, those areas are quintessentially
suburban.”).
75 Kushner, supra note 4, at 65.
76 Id. at 56.
77 Id.
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single-family dwellings. Thus, LVT promotes transit-oriented development,78
which “protects lower-income populations from marginalization by offering
mixed-income housing in a connected and socially and economically diverse
setting.”79
LVT can also help ensure that New Urbanism is accessible to people in all
socioeconomic ranges and demographics. This is crucial for the success of
New Urbanist communities. A critical tenet of the New Urbanist philosophy
of neighborhoods is that communities should be diverse, leading to a rich
tapestry and deep communal heritage.80 The denser, more walkable
developments incentivized by LVT are attractive to minorities. A recent Pew
Foundation study shows a divide among Americans regarding the ideal built
environment: 48% prefer walkable, mixed-use settings while 49% prefer a
more traditional suburban setting centered around a car.81 Of those surveyed,
Hispanics, then African-Americans, were the most likely to prefer a denser
built environment.82 Those with a college degree were more likely to prefer
denser accommodations.83 Additionally, young adults and those over sixtyfive (particularly women) prefer a more walkable landscape.84 The conclusion
gleaned from this data is that walkable neighborhoods are desirable to a diverse
range of people. Thus, the creation of denser neighborhoods should result in
diversity and create the vibrant neighborhoods New Urbanists seek.85
LVT also reduces the price of housing, which helps ensure that the denser
neighborhoods it incentivizes are mixed-income. LVT reduces the price of
housing both on the supply side—by increasing the supply of housing—and
on the demand side—by eliminating the tax on building improvements, thus
lowering a homeowner’s tax burden.86 LVT increases the supply of housing
by creating strong incentives to build more structures; invariably, some of
78 See Speirs, supra note 52, at 32-35 (explaining how LVT creates transit-oriented development
and the advantages of transit-oriented development).
79 M. Tanner Clagett, If It’s Not Mixed-Income, It Won’t be Transit-Oriented: Ensuring Our Future
Developments Are Equitable & Promote Transit, 41 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 2 (2014).
80 See Rebecca R. Sohmer & Robert E. Lang, From Seaside to Southside: New Urbanism’s Quest
to Save the Inner City, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 751, 757-758 (2000) (explaining that New
Urbanists seek to design neighborhoods that blend housing of different socioeconomic strata).
81 Robert Steuteville, America Split Between Two Community Ideals, BETTER CITIES & TOWNS
(June 13, 2014), http://bettercities.net/news-opinion/blogs/robert-steuteville/21157/ america-splitbetween-two-community-ideals [http://perma.cc/WYQ5-7WMT].
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Byrne, supra note 27, at 1596-97 (describing the ideal neighborhoods envisioned by New
Urbanists); cf. J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 406 (2003) (arguing
that “gentrification is good on balance for the poor and ethnic minorities” because it brings about
more cohesive neighborhoods with necessary retail amenities, high property values, and thick social
bonds).
86 Speirs, supra note 52, at 27-29.
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these new structures will be residential. An increase in the supply of housing
results in a decrease in the price of housing. Further, LVT generally lowers
property taxes on housing.87 Lower property taxes not only reduce the price
of housing, but also make more people eligible to buy homes. When banks
review mortgages, they include property tax payments in the cost of the
mortgage payments, which means that higher property taxes lead to higher
income requirements to qualify for a mortgage. Thus, a reduction in property
taxes reduces the amount a borrower must earn to be eligible for a mortgage.88
In sum, LVT promotes infill development by reducing the tax on
buildings, which facilitates revitalization of urban spaces and creates
incentives to replace and repair dilapidated buildings.89 Further, LVT induces
property owners to build more densely by raising the costs of holding
unproductive land.90
2. Land Speculation and Farm Land Conversion
Land Value Taxation has the ability to curb sprawl not only by
incentivizing infill development but also by slowing the conversion of
farmland into suburbs and even exurbs. It can even benefit family farmers.
One of the major effects of suburban sprawl is the disappearance of
American farmlands.91 A major cause of the evaporation of farmland is
landowners speculating on suburban growth by buying large tracts of
farmland, farming it sparingly, and hoping to reap a huge capital gain by
selling to a suburban developer.92 Alanna Hartzok calls these speculators
“real-estate farmers,”93 who cause sprawl by holding “out for high capital gains
on acreage cheaply obtained years ago.”94 These real-estate farmers create a
87 See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF ECON., LAND VALUE TAXATION: TITUSVILLE,
PENNSYLVANIA 3 (2007), http://www.urbantoolsconsult.org/upload/Titusville%202007.pdf [http:
//perma.cc/K9K8-HBNE] (finding that residential property taxes decreased by 5.57% after the city
shifted to LVT).
88 See Speirs, supra note 52, at 27-28 (estimating that the salary required to qualify for a
mortgage on a $158,000 home [$150,000 structure value, $8000 land value] under a traditional
property tax system is $40,500, but only $33,400 under LVT).
89 Gihring, supra note 38, at 63-64.
90 Id. at 63.
91 Rick Rybeck, Tax Reform Motivates Sustainable Development, AM. INST. ARCHITECTS/D.C.
NEWS, Dec. 1995–Jan. 1996, at 4, 4-5 (noting that as a result of sprawl, “undeveloped areas are too
small and too scattered to support meaningful agricultural or conservation uses”).
92 Mason Gaffney, Rising Inequality and Falling Property Tax Rates (showing empirically that
large farms experience fewer improvements, and that one possible hypothesis explaining this is that
larger plots are purchased as “place[s] to park slack money” rather than as vehicles for enterprise
and development), in LAND OWNERSHIP AND TAXATION IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 119
(Gene Wunderlich ed. 1993).
93 Hartzok, supra note 42, at 254.
94 Id. at 249.
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leap-frog pattern of suburban sprawl as they go farther and farther out to
purchase cheap farmland and reap a capital gain.95 In the alternative and even
more insidious case,
Land near public infrastructure such as a subway station or major road
intersection remains vacant or grossly underutilized because a landowner is
waiting for a price in excess of what space users will pay today. This
phenomenon forces developers to seek cheaper sites that are farther away
from public infrastructure.96

This leapfrog version of sprawl drives up the price of land at the urban
fringe, making it more expensive for farmers to farm that land.97 As Hartzok
explains:
Sprawl penalizes farmers who want to raise crops rather than speculate and
it discourages farm improvements on fringe land around cities. Sprawl drives
up the price of land in rural areas. It also fuels land speculation while making
it increasingly difficult to secure access to affordable land for farming
operations.98

Since 1930, there has been a sharp decline in property taxes on farmland.99
While lowering taxes on farmland may on its face seem beneficial to farmers,
the evidence suggests that it actually hurts farmers by lowering the holding
costs of farmland.100 Although well-intentioned, this policy of lowering the
holding costs of farmland creates incentives for increased land speculation and
more urban sprawl.101 Accordingly, lower property tax rates correlate with
larger farm size and less intensive use of farmland.102
Lower property tax rates particularly hurt small farmers who are more
likely to make capital improvements to land than larger corporate farmers.
For example, Gaffney surveyed the nine states with the highest property taxes
and the nine states with the lowest property taxes on farmland.103 He found,
counterintuitively, that higher property taxes led to smaller farms, more

95 See McIlwain, supra note 1 (explaining that the sustained rapid growth of the farthest edges
of the suburbs may support the inference that under the current system, sprawl will continue to
grow outward).
96 Hartzok, supra note 42, at 250.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Gaffney, supra note 92, at 119-20 (showing a decrease in the national average of farm property
tax rates from their peak of 1.32% in 1930 to 0.77% in 1945, before stabilizing at 0.85% in 1987).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 120-24.
102 Id. at 119.
103 Id. at 128-31.
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intensive farming, and higher investments in machinery and buildings.104 All
of these attributes are characteristics of a family farm.105 He concluded that
higher property taxes actually have an egalitarian effect despite the “negative
incentive effects” caused by taking building value into account at all.106 He
speculated that the egalitarian effect “would be stronger if the tax base was
limited to naked land value, because the [land share of real estate value] rises
steeply with size of farm. Untaxing buildings would also eliminate negative
incentive effects.”107 Thus, LVT can also help slow sprawl at the suburban
fringes by raising the holding cost for land speculators and creating incentives
for more family farming.
Hartzok explains how LVT attacks one of the causes of suburban sprawl:
The economic incentives promoting sprawl can be partially explained by the
unproductive way in which landowners earn money. Either a landowner can
make money by developing a site and renting or selling it to someone who
will use that development; or the owner can wait for population increases,
wage increases, or improvements in public infrastructure to impart value to
a site, which he can appropriate through a higher rent or sales price . . . .
Landowners who underutilize valuable land sites with speculative intent
thus contribute to sprawl and the costly, inefficient use of infrastructure.108

LVT partially reverses these economic incentives in two ways. First,
because it functions essentially as a user fee for land, it creates an incentive
to use land rather than hold it unproductively for speculative gain. Second, it
creates strong incentives not only to use farmland for agricultural purposes,
but to make capital investments into the agricultural enterprise by decreasing
the tax on capital improvements to land.
In total then, LVT can slow sprawl both in urban cores, by creating strong
incentives for increased density, and at the suburban fringes, by raising the
cost of land speculation and giving family famers incentives to invest in
improvements to their farms.
III. LAND VALUE TAXATION AND THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION
In their recent book, Bruce Katz and Jennifer Bradley boldly proclaim “[a]
revolution is stirring in America. Like all revolutions, this one starts with a
simple but profound truth: [C]ities and metropolitan areas are the engines of

104
105
106
107
108

Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Hartzok, supra note 42, at 250.
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economic prosperity and social transformation in the United States.”109 They
explain that “[m]etros dominate because they embody concentration and
agglomeration—networks of innovative firms, talented workers, risk-taking
entrepreneurs, and supportive institutions that cluster together in
metropolitan areas and coproduce economic performance and progress.”110
Katz and Bradley contend “[t]he metro revolution reflects the maturing of
U.S. cities and metros in terms of capacity and focus. Over the past three
decades, these communities have innovated on the form of their places,
regenerating downtowns, revitalizing waterfronts, restoring historic
buildings, inspiring grand architecture, [and] expanding transit . . . .”111
Moreover, metros are now “focusing on their function and the very shape and
structure of their economies, taking on the core elements that drive
economies: innovation, human capital, infrastructure, advanced industry.”112
Given its ability to curb suburban sprawl, Land Value Taxation can be the
shield, fuel, and product of this exciting revolution.
A. Land Value Taxation as Shield and Fuel of the Metropolitan Revolution
Sprawl threatens the core benefits of the Metropolitan Revolution: “Sprawl
negates the purpose of cities, which is to let people live and work close together
so as to utilize and enjoy the greatest efficiency of community facilities and
enterprises.”113 The very fact that the metropolitan revolution is taking place is
evidence of the beneficial effects of cities. As Katz and Bradley point out, “[o]ur
nation’s top 100 metropolitan areas sit on only 12 percent of the nation’s land
mass but are home to two-thirds of our population and generate 75 percent of

109

BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES
METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 1 (2013); see also
Benton C. Martin, Federalism and Municipal Innovation: Lessons from the Fight Against Vacant Properties,
46 URB. LAW. 361 (2014) (citing Katz and Bradley with approval and using their thesis to glean lessons
from metro area collaborations to fight blight); Sheila A. Martin & Carolyn N. Long, Horizontal
Intergovernmental Relations in the Portland Metropolitan Region: Challenges and Successes, 50 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 589, 591 (2014) (citing Katz and Bradley and applying their paradigm to the Portland area);
Nancy Cook, When Cities and Suburbs Work Together, ATLANTIC (May 2, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/when-cities-and-suburbs-worktogether/391979/?utm_source=SFFB [http://perma.cc/PBU6-NWB6] (adding further evidence to
Katz and Bradley’s theory by providing new examples of collaboration in New York and Denver
delineating the problems caused by competition among cities within a metropolitan area).
110 KATZ & BRADLEY, supra note 109, at 1.
111 Id. at 4-5.
112 Id. at 5.
113 Hartzok, supra note 42, at 249. See generally EDWARD GLAESER, THE TRIUMPH OF THE
CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER,
HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER (2011) (arguing that the collaboration fostered by denser city dwelling
produces more human prosperity).
AND
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our national GDP.”114 The benefits of living in close proximity to other
intelligent and industrious people must be safeguarded, and LVT accomplishes
this goal by discouraging suburban sprawl. Thus, LVT can be a shield for the
Metropolitan Revolution by helping to ensure that the new prosperity created
by metropolitan areas does not drive people out of those same metropolitan
areas. This is a real concern given that high-income households represent the
highest demand for low-density, sprawling development.115
Similarly, LVT can fuel the metropolitan revolution by creating incentives
for increased density. Further, LVT’s benefits are precisely in line with the
goals of the Metropolitan Revolution: better, sturdier buildings, increased use
of public transportation, more efficient utilization of land and infrastructure
resources, increased low income housing supply, and more walkable and
distinct neighborhoods.
B. Land Value Taxation: A Product of the Metropolitan Revolution
One key feature of the Metropolitan Revolution is that it is truly
metropolitan: it is characterized by groups of jurisdictions within a single
metro area collaborating rather than competing with one another.116 This is
an encouraging development given that during the late twentieth century’s
migration to the suburbs “individuals sought control over the development
of their new communities, and coupled with the evolution of state law towards
easier municipal incorporation, the existence of local [autonomous]
governments exploded.”117 By 1992, there were an average of 113 local
governments per metropolitan area.118 This massive proliferation of
autonomous municipalities is born of localism, which is the “concept of legal
and political empowerment of autonomous municipalities, as a response to
the idea that regional or state influences undermine that autonomy during
their decision-making processes.”119 The morass of autonomous local
governments created by localism often leads to wasteful competition between
municipalities and difficulty in providing solutions for problems best
114
115

KATZ & BRADLEY supra note 109, at 1.
Seong-Hoon Cho et al., Moderating Urban Sprawl Through Land Value Taxation 4 (Am. Agric.
Econ. Ass’n, Selected Paper No. 468873, 2008), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/
6150/2/468873.pdf [http://perma.cc/YL4X-34C8] (“[S]trong preferences for lower-density
development among higher income households may exist.”) (citing P. Gordon & H.W. Richardson,
Prove It, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1998, at 23; Andrejs Skaburskis, Housing Prices and Housing Density:
Do Higher Prices Make Cities More Compact?, 23 CANADIAN J. REGIONAL SCI. 455 (2000)).
116 See KATZ & BRADLEY supra note 109, at 41-63 (detailing the Denver Metro’s transformation
from a group of competing and parochial municipalities to a collaborative effort).
117 Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1091 (citing Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of
the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1992 (2000)).
118 Id. at 1091.
119 Id.
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addressed at the regional level.120 In short, these local governments face a
collective action problem: “Certain challenges can be addressed more
effectively at a regional [or metropolitan] scale because individual local
governments lack the capacity or resources to address certain issues without
the cooperation of neighboring jurisdictions.”121
Sprawl is one of these crucial areas where regional effort is needed to
address a serious social problem.122 Polmateer argues convincingly that
localism has proven a significant stumbling block for New Urbanism.123 He
argues that even though most Americans live seamlessly in a metropolitan
area, moving from one municipality to the next without suffering any effects
from crossing jurisdictional lines, these independent municipalities have
failed to connect those few New Urbanist developments that independent
governments may succeed in creating.124 Polmateer contends “the failure of
new urbanism lies in its inability to break free from localism’s isolationist
tendencies and integrate these new urbanist developments into the
surrounding region.”125 Polmateer posits: “[N]ew regionalism provides the
missing piece to the proper implementation of new urbanism.”126 New
regionalism comprises “any attempt to develop regional governance
structures or interlocal cooperative agreements that better distribute regional
benefits and burdens.”127 In short, new regionalism encourages exactly the sort
of collaboration that Katz and Bradley trumpet as the touchstone of the
Metropolitan Revolution.
LVT is precisely the sort of growth management tool that is best
implemented at a regional level. As we saw above, LVT has the power both
to revitalize urban cores by creating more intense development and to stop
suburban sprawl by decreasing the value of speculating on farmland. These
twin results can only be maximized, however, at the regional level. It is not
enough for the major city within a metro to implement LVT; this will only
produce the infill prong of LVT’s sprawl-reducing power. Pittsburgh’s
120 Cashin, supra note 117, at 2033 (suggesting that “robust regionalism . . . better distributes
benefits and burdens”).
121 LINDA MCCARTHY, U.S. ECON. DEV. ADMIN., COMPETITIVE REGIONALISM: BEYOND
INDIVIDUAL COMPETITION 4 (2000).
122 See Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 21 (2000) (“Local issues
like sprawl . . . may not be capable of successful resolution at the local level.”).
123 Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1093.
124 Id.; see also PETER CALTHORPE & WILLIAM FULTON, THE REGIONAL CITY: PLANNING
FOR THE END OF SPRAWL 6 (2001) (“[W]e live in an aggregation of cities and suburbs: a metropolitan
community that forms one economic, cultural, environmental, and civic entity . . . . The health of this
new region depends on the interconnectedness of these [cities and suburbs] . . . .”).
125 Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1093.
126 Id. at 1094.
127 Id. at 1130 (citing Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to
Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 632 (2011)).
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experiment with LVT underscores this point. While the city itself showed a
significant uptick in density and development after implementing LVT, the
data is severely lacking as to LVT’s effect on the surrounding suburbs.
Pittsburgh switched to a two-rate property tax system in 1979, raising the
tax rate on land to five times that of improvements to land.128 In a comparative
study of fifteen “rust belt” cities from 1980 to 1989, only two had an increased
average annual value of building permits for commercial buildings: Columbus
(15.43%) and Pittsburgh (70.43%).129 Pittsburgh is a “remarkable outlier; the
real value of building permits on an annual basis rose by some 70 percent in
the 1980s relative to the twenty-year period preceding the tax reform.”130
Notably, much of Pittsburgh’s increased building value owed to a shortage of
commercial space in the region.131 Nevertheless, the reliance on increased
land taxation played an important supporting role in stimulating
development.132
Similarly, a survey of the handful of Pennsylvania municipalities (including
Pittsburgh) that implemented LVT showed that a split-rate tax system resulted
in a three to four percent increase in the value of residential construction
permits.133 And finally, a 1992 study found a strong correlation between building
density and split-rate taxation.134 Thus, it appears individual municipalities can
employ LVT’s ability to encourage infill development.
If, however, only a few municipalities in a metro area adopt LVT, its
power to stop land speculation at the suburban fringe will not be
appropriately exploited. To be sure, increased density in and around central
business districts might relieve some pressure on the far suburbs by
decreasing the demand for housing.135 Developers might even have an
incentive to build in the municipality with LVT given the preferential
treatment of improvements. Speculators, however, will not be deterred
because the demand for large, low-density housing is greatest among high-

128
129
130
131
132
133

Oates & Schwab, supra note 65, at 1, 9.
Id. at 42 tbl.3.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 9, 20.
Id. at 22.
See, e.g., Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, A Markov Chain Monte Carlo Analysis
of the Effect of Two-Rate Property Taxes on Construction, 47 J. URB. ECON. 216 (2000).
134 Kenneth M. Lusht, The Site Value Tax and Residential Development (1992) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the University of Virginia Law Library) (avoiding reverse causality
problems by reducing sample to twenty-eight suburban communities that had substantial amounts
of developable land available at the time these communities adopted split-rate taxation).
135 See, e.g., Hartzok, supra note 42, at 251 (“By encouraging development within the existing
urbanized areas, the two-rate property tax counteracts sprawl and land speculation, and thereby
decreases development pressures and escalation of land prices on nearby farmlands and rural areas.”).
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income individuals.136 Therefore, demand for large homes on large plots at
the suburban fringes will still exist. The pattern of leapfrog development will
continue unabated unless appropriate disincentives are put in place. As
demonstrated, LVT represents one such disincentive. Its effect, however, will
be diminished unless the entire region implements it. Doing so would raise
the costs of farmland speculation across the entire metro region and force the
development of adequate, medium-density housing in the regions
surrounding the central business district.
Without the sort of regional collaboration promised by the Metropolitan
Revolution, LVT’s potential to reign in sprawl will not be realized. LVT can
moderate the demand for open space at the fringes of metro areas by using “a
sliding land value tax . . . targeting ‘critical’ sprawl areas.”137 But implementing
such a sliding scale that targets critical sprawl areas by raising the tax rate on land
will require massive collaboration among the varied municipalities that comprise
the outer rims of metro areas. These municipalities will not only need to share
data, but they must also be willing to raise land tax rates to slow sprawl within
their borders and force it into neighboring jurisdictions. This will require a level
of trust and cooperation as yet unseen.
This shifting approach is like herding sheep: the sheep are sprawl, and the
dog is LVT. LVT needs to be constantly shifting around the perimeter of the
sprawl to keep it hemmed in. Such a massive collaborative effort can only be
the result of the Metropolitan Revolution and a growing awareness among
suburban municipalities that what is good for the region as a whole is good
for the individual municipality.138 Controlling sprawl will lead to an increased
tax base, stop the drain of human capital, and lead to a more efficient
utilization of municipal resources.139
To summarize, for LVT to have a maximal halting effect on sprawl, it must
be implemented both in the major city within a metro area as well as in the
surrounding suburban municipalities on a sliding scale targeting key sprawl
areas. This effort will require tremendous collaboration by the municipalities
within a given metro area. While this level of cooperation is unprecedented,
the Metropolitan Revolution provides evidence and hope that it is not out of
reach.
136 See Cho et al., supra note 115, at 4 (“[S]trong preferences for lower-density development
among higher income households may exist.”).
137 Id. at 7.
138 See Polmateer, supra note 2, at 1112 (explaining that localism leads to competitive behavior
among neighboring municipalities even though “no locality is actually isolated because what happens
in one area has a direct effect on its neighbors.”); see also Cook, supra note 109 (discussing the benefits
of regional collaboration in Denver, where “[t]he city and its surrounding suburbs had to decide that
working together was preferable to struggling separately”).
139 Cook, supra note 109.
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CONCLUSION
The tremendous progress made by New Urbanists in reforming the singleuse zoning codes that impede their ability to create the neighborhoods for
which they advocate provides an opportunity for the movement to reflect on
other obstacles to its agenda. Our current single tier property tax system is just
such an obstacle because it creates strong incentives for sprawling development.
A switch to Land Value Taxation (LVT) can undo these perverse incentives.
Land Value Taxation, however, would be most effective if implemented at the
regional/metropolitan level because sprawl is a regional problem requiring a
regional response. By following the lead of the Metropolitan Revolution and
collaborating to implement LVT, the many jurisdictions comprising a
metropolitan area can fully capitalize on LVT’s twin ability to encourage infill
development and slow suburban land speculation. In sum, LVT is a promising
new avenue for creating New Urbanist communities.
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